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RECENT DECISIONS
Deadlocked Juries-THE "ALLEN CHARGE" IS DEFUSED-United States v.

Thomas
A deadlocked jury remains an ever-present problem to a judge whose
docket is filled with cases to be litigated. Throughout history, crude methods
of coercion have been -employed by judges to pry a verdict from a deadlocked jury.' While such methods have long since been abandoned, a more
subtle, though equally effective, device known as the "Allen charge" 2 is
still utilized today to bring about the same result.
The "Allen charge," first upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Allen v. United States,2 is employed by trial judges to blast deadlocked
juries into reaching a verdict;4 hence its nickname, the "dynamite charge." 5
I See Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22, 28 (5th Cir. 1965) (Brown, J, dissenting)The rule at common law authorized the court to confine the jury under strict
charge of a bailiff, to be fed on bread and water till the end of a term unless a
verdict was sooner returned; and if a verdict was not then returned, to transport
them around in a cart until they did agree on a verdict.
People v. Sheldon, 156 N.Y. 268, 269, 50 N.E. 840, 842 (1898):
By ancient common law, jurors were kept together as prisoners of the court
until they had agreed upon their verdicts. It was regarded as not only proper
but requisite that they should be coerced to an agreement upon a verdict.
For specific instances of coercion, see, e.g., Pope v. State, 36 Miss. 121 (1858) (threat
of no food or drink until verdict reached); Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198,
157 A.2d 65 (1959) (jurors required to deliberate all night); Mead v. City of Richland
Center, 237 Vis. 537, 297 N.W. 419 (1941) (threat to turn off water and heat in jury
room).

2 The name of the charge is derived from the case of Allen v. United States, 164U.S. 492, 501 (1896), where the Supreme Court approved the charge given in the trial
court below. The charge was stated by the court as follows:
... [Tjhat in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror,
and not a mere acquiesence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should
examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they
could conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable
one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest,
equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably
doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority.
3 164 US. 492 (1896). The charge was first used in Commonwealth v. Tuey, 62
Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851) and in 1896 was given constitutional approval by the Supreme
Court in Allen.
4
See Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962).
5
See Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dis-
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Today, the great weight of authority in this country recognizes as proper

the giving of the charge by a trial judge to a deadlocked jury.6 In fact, no
court, state or federal, has held that the "Allen charge" is per se coercive or
unconstitutional. 7 However, it should be noted that while a charge which
strictly adheres to that approved in Allen v. United States has been held to,
be proper,s courts have been quick to hold certain variations of the charge'
invalid. 9
senting). The "Allen charge" has acquired other descriptives which attest to its effect
on deadlocked juries. See, e.g., Leech v. People, 112 Colo. 129, 146 P.2d 346 (1944),
(refers to charge as "3rd degree" instruction); State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 321 P.2d
202 (1958) (refers to charge as "shotgun instruction").
6See, e.g., Kawaldta v. United States, 190 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 717
(1952); Lias v. United States, 51 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 284 U.S. 584
(1931). For other cases so holding, see Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 177, 182-84 (1965). See
generally 53 Am.JuR. Trial § 956 (1945); 89 C.J.S. Trial § 481 (1955).
It should be noted that while there are many variations of the "Allen charge," a charge
which falls within the scope of that approved in Allen vi. United States has three main
elements: an emphasis by the judge that no juror is expected to yield his conscientiously
held opinion; a charge to dissenting jurors that they give consideration to the majority's
opinion, if the much larger number are for conviction or acquittal; and an urging that
minority jurors reconsider the correctness, of their views since not concurred in by the
majority of jurors. The dynamite of the "dynamite charge" rests in the second and third
,elements.
7Seo Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 552 (Sth Cir. 1969):
We initially reject the claim that the Allen charge itself must be held today,
some 70 years after the decision, to be coercive, prejudicial, and unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has not yet seen fit to disavow it and, so long as it stands
approved in decided Supreme Court cases, we are not to resolve that issue contrarily.
Every federal circuit has at one time approved the "Allen charge." See, e.g., Mills
v. Tinsley, 314 F.2d 311 (10th Cit. 1963); Bowen v. United States, 153 F.2d 747 (8th
Cir. 1946); Bord v. United States, 133 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cit. 1942); Weathers v. United
States, 126 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1942); Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934);
United States v. Commerford, 64 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1933); Lias v. United States, 51 F.2d
215 (4th Cit. 1931); Israel v. United States, 3 F.2d 743 (6th Cit. 1925); Shaffman v.
United States, 289 F. 370 (3d Cit. 1923); Shea v. United States, 260 F. 807 (9th Cir.
1919); Boston & M. R.R. v. Stewart, 254 F. 14 (1st Cit. 1918).
In addition fifteen states have expressly authorized the "Allen charge." Today, two
states, Montana and Arizona and two federal districts, the 7th and 3d (in addition to the
Thomas case which banned the charge in the D.C. Circuit) have banned the "Allen
charge." But in none of these was the charge itself, as approved in Allen v. United
States, held to be coercive per se or unconstitutional. In each, the state and federal
courts banned the charge on supervisory grounds. It remains today for some court
to declare the "Allen charge" unconstitutional and coercive per se.
8 See cases cited note 6 supra.
9 The fact that the courts are willing to accept the "Allen charge," but nothing
beyond this, is seen in United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cit. 1961) where
the court stated that "[tlhe charge approved in Allen approaches the limits to which
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Recently, the "Allen charge" has become the subject of extreme criticism
both from the bench and from legal writers alike.10 The recent case of
the court should go . .. ." Also in United States v. Smith, 303 F.2d 341, 343 (4th Cir.
1962) the court held that "[u]naccented and unembellished, the Allen charge is quite
bold enough ..."
For cases in which the trial courts varied the wording of the charge, as approved by
the Supreme Court, and were reversed see, e.g., Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318
(5th Cir. 1961) (where the judge added to the charge that it was not to the credit of
a juror to stand out in a pure spirit of stubbornness); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d
433 (4th Cir. 1961) (where the trial judge failed to include language emphasizing the
individual juror's right to retain his conscientiously held dissenting viewpoint);
Kelsey v. United States, 47 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1931) (where a judge added to the charge
that unless the jury reached a verdict they would be violating the sacredness of their
oaths as jurors); Stewart v. United States, 300 F. 769 (8th Cir. 1924) (where the court
added language emphasizing a duty to agree). See generally Comment, Defusing the
Dynamite Charge: A Critique of Allen and its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REv. 749, 755-56
(1969); Note, Due Process, Judiciary Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination
of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123, 128-30 (1967); Annot., 100 A..R. 2d 177
(1965).
For cases where the wording of Allen-type charges were closely scrutinized by the
courts but not held error, see, e.g., Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1965); Jenkins v. United States,
330 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting); Huffman v. United States,
297 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting).
It is submitted that this constant struggle with the wording of the various Allen-type
charges evidences an uneasy acceptance of the "Allen charge" by the courts. Indeed,
any charge which goes beyond that approved by the Supreme Court is held to be coercive. Should such a precarious instruction remain a majority concept today?
10 For criticism of the "Allen charge" on the federal court level, see, e.g., United
States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969) (the "Allen charge" departs from the
sole legitimate purpose of a jury to bring back a verdict based on the law and
evidence received in an open court); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.
1969) (the charge interferes with the accused's right to a fair and impartial jury trial);
Thaggard v. United States 354 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J, specially concurring) (if the Allen case were submitted to the Supreme Court today, the result
might not be the same as it was in 1896); Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting) (a hung jury can be a safeguard to liberty); Green
v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962) (there is small if any justification for the
use of the charge); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom,
J.,dissenting) (the charge causes more trouble in the administration of justice than it
is worth); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting)
(there is no longer any use for the charge).
For criticism of the "Allen charge" on the state court level, see, e.g., State v. Thomas,
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959) (the evils of the charge far outweighs the benefits);
dissenting) (most courts
State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 210 P.2d 972 (1949) (Udall, J.,
tolerate the charge rather than commend it and many agree it would be better for the
courts to omit the instruction); Eikmeier v. Bennett, 143 Kan. 888, 57 P.2d 87 (1936)
(the charge has a potential to coerce); State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054
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United States v. Thomas," banning the "Allen charge" within the District
of Columbia Circuit, reflects a growing trend in case decisions holding the
2
charge improper.
In Thomas the court was faced with a charge which varied from that approved in Allen v. United States 3 and was highly coercive.' 4 The charge
had been given to a deadlocked jury in the trial court below and had quickly
induced a verdict. In keeping with the majority of jurisdictions, the court
held that a charge which varies the proper thrust of the "Allen charge" is
error. 15 Unwilling to stop at this point, the Thomas court broke with the
16
majority and banned the use of the "Allen charge" completely.
(1960) (it is improper to discourage jurors from taking a view contrary to that entertained by the majority).
Legal writings also are critical of the "Allen charge" and suggest its abolition. See,
e.g., AM. BAR Ass'N PROJECr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FoR GCIM. JusTIcE, TRIAL By
JuRY, 146 (Tentative Draft, 1968); Comment, Defusing the Dynamite Charge: A
Critique of Allen and its Progeny, 36 TEN. L. Rv. 749 (1969); Note, Deadlocked
Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the Allen Charge, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 386
(1964); Note, Due Process,Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of
the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123 (1967); Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries,
78 YAaE L.. 100 (1968).
In Clark, Progress of Project Effective Justice-A Report on the joint Committee,
47 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 89, 90 (1963)

Mr. Justice Clark gave credence to this criticism of

the charge when he stated:
Nor do we circulate the Allen charge to the new judges as I used to when
heading up the criminal division in the Department of Justice. Allen is dead and
we do not believe in dead law.
11449 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
12 The trend toward outlawing the "Allen charge" first began in the state courts.
Arizona became the first state to ban the charge in State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342
P.2d 197 (1959). Montana followed suit in State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054
(1960). The federal courts, after struggling with the charge for years, began to follow
the trend in the late 1960's. Two federal circuits, the 3d and 7th, banned the "Allen
charge" in United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969) and United States
v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1969). On September 14, 1971 the D.C. Circuit became
the third federal district to ban the use of the charge.
13 See note 2 supra.
14 After giving the standard "Allen charge" to the jury, the trial judge upon learning
that the jury was deadlocked added this sentence to the charge: "I am sure you ladies
and gentlemen know we have a substantial backlog of work, and to spend another day
before another jury just doesn't make sense to me." The Thomas court held this
variation of the "Allen charge" was coercive and grounds for reversal.
15 See note 9 supra.
16 Even so, the split (5-4) decision of the Thomas court reflects the difficult struggle
in the judiciary between those who feel the charge should remain in force and those
who believe it should be banned. The narrowness of the majority's margin evidences the
reluctance of the courts to depart from a decision which has stood as the law for
seventy-five years.
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While the action taken by the Thomas court is significant, it is submitted
that the court failed to go far enough in its decision. The justices chose to
ban the "Allen charge" under the supervisory authority of the court 1 instead of ruling that the charge is unconstitutional and coercive per se.' 8
Three chief criticisms have been advanced against the "Allen charge" by
its foes in urging that the charge should be banned. The first of these, on
which the Thomas court based its decision, 19 is that the use of the "Allen
charge," with its many variations, subjects appellate courts to too many
20
appeals concerning the validity of the charge in each particular case.
A second and seemingly more direct attack is that the charge is per se
coercive. The general rule is that a juror may not be coerced by the judge
into voting against his conscientious belief.21 Yet, the very purpose of the
"dynamite charge" is to generate a verdict where the jury appears to be
deadlocked. 22 The charge is dearly coercive because it strongly indicates
17See State ex rel. Regis v. District Court, 102 Mont. 74, 55 P.2d 1295 (1936) (the
supervisory authority exercised by circuit courts is employed to control the course of
litigation in the trial court when necessary to prevent extended and needless litigation).
1The Thomas court stated: "We have not held that the Allen charge is per se
coercive; rather we have predicated our decision on the needs of judicial administration." Thus instead of periodically laboring the refinement of "Allen-charge" language
,the court decided to exercise its supervisory power over the administration of law in
the D.C. Circuit and ban further use of the "Allen charge."
19 See note 18 supra.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969) (the use of the
charge is an invitation for perennial appellate review); Andrews v. United States, 309
F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (the charge causes more trouble in the
administration of justice than it is worth); State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197
(1959) (the continued use of the charge will result in an endless chain of decisions);
State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 210 P.2d 972 (1949) (Udall, J., dissenting) (the charge
will not remain at rest).
It is not uncommon for the federal courts of appeal to be confronted with a plethora
of issues. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (is it proper
to give the charge before the jury retires?); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1962) (is it wrong to emphasize certain parts of the charge?); Huffman v. United
States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting) (do additions to the charge
make it coercive?); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1961) (does failure
to include necessary language make the charge coercive?); Anderson v. United States,
262 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1959) (may the charge be given after the court is advised, upon
inquiry, that the jury is evenly divided?); Bowen v. United States, 153 F.2d 747 (8th
Cir. 1946) (is the giving of the charge following a voluntary revelation of the numerical
split of the jury inherently coercive?).
2
1See, e.g., United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir. 1969); Billeci v.
United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Meadows v. State, 182 Ala. 51, 62 So.
737, 738 (1913); Riggins v. State, 226 Ga. 381, 174 S.E.2d 908, 911 (1970). See also
58 AM. JuR. 2d New Trial § 111 (1971).
22
See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir. 1969).
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that the jury must reach a verdict, when in fact there is no such rule, 23
and it is aimed squarely at the minority jurors with no corresponding charge
to the majority. 24 Moreover, the "Allen charge" is based on the theory that
the majority is correct or at least has better judgment than the minority,
when again no such rule in fact exists. 25 The jury system rests primarily
on the assumption that jurors should deliberate patiently and for extended
periods of time if necessary in reaching their decision. 26 In violation of this
27
policy, the "Allen charge" pressures a juror toward reaching a verdct
and usually induces quick agreement in that regard. 28 Thus, the danger
becomes clear that a minority juror may be coerced into changing his con29
scientiously held belief by the use of the charge.
23 See Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 740 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J.,
specially concurring); Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(Wright, J., dissenting).
24This danger is pointed out by United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d
Cit. 1969) where court stated: "Thus is revealed the very real treachery of the Allen
Charge. It contains no admonition that the majority reexamine its position; it cautions
only the minority to see the error of its ways:' The court in Eikrneier v. Bennett, 143
Kan. 888, 891, 57 P.2d 87, 92 (1936) adds: "To say to a minority that they should
re-examine their views . . . without putting a like duty on the majority . . . is wrong!'
25 See, e.g., United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir. 1969); Green v.

United States, 309 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1962).
After hearing the "Allen charge" with its instruction to the minority juror not to
forsake his conscientiously held belief, yet to reconsider the correctness of his opinion
in light of that of the majority, a minority juror might reason as follows:
The majority think he is guilty; the court thinks I ought to agree with the
majority so the court must think he is guilty. While the court did tell me not to
surrender my conscientious convictions, he told me to doubt seriously the correctness of my own judgment. The court was talking directly to me, since I am the one
who is keeping everyone from going home. So I will just have to change my vote.
State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 152, 210 P.2d 972, 980 (1949) (Udall, J., dissenting).
26 See Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962); 5 WHARToN's CRIMINAL
LAw AND PROCDURE § 2116, at 299 (1957).

1 27 See Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962); Huffman v. United States,
2972 8 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting).
See Burrup v. United States, 371 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1967) (Phillips, J., concurring): "I know from trial court experience that the Allen instruction, when given
usually induces quick agreement on a verdict by the jury." Mr. Justice Frankfurter
explained the reason for this result in Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612
(1946):
An experienced trial judge should have realized that such a long wrangle in the
jury room . . . would leave the jury in a state of frayed nerves and fatigued attention, with the desire to go home and escape overnight detention, particularly
in view of a plain hint from the judge that a verdict ought to be forthcoming.
29
See Burrup v. United States, 371 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1967). For a thorough
discussion of the coercive effect of the "Allen charge" and the danger it presents see
Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the Allen Charge, 31 U.
Cm. L. REv. 386 (1964).
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The third criticism of the charge is that it is unconstitutional.30 The
United States Constitution guarantees an accused a trial by an impartial
jury.S1 However, where a judge, in his position of authority,3 2 directs the
"Allen charge" to the minority jurors, there is a strong possibility that the
constitutionally protected impartiality can no longer be achieved.33 Furthermore, if the charge, as contended, influences a single juror to forsake his
valid belief and vote with the majority, then the State has not proved its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.3 4 The accused has thus been denied due
process of law, for he has been convicted not on the basis of evidence presented in court,35 but rather through the jurors' response to what they take
36
to be the desire of the judge.
30 For a discussion of the constitutionality of the charge, see Comment, Defusing the
Dynamite Charge: A Critique of Allen and its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REv. 749, 750-54
(1969); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination
of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123, 136-44 (1967).
31 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966). Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735 (5th
Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., specially concurring); Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779 (10th
Cir. 1942). Thus, the sixth amendment guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury should
mean that the jury be free from every influence except the law and evidence.
32 The authority which the judge commands is pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller
in Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894):
It is obvious that under any system the influence of the trial judge is necessarily
and properly of great weight and that his lightest word or intimation is received
with deference and may prove controlling.
33See Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J,
specially concurring):
The real burden of what I am saying is that the essential meaning of Constitutionally guaranteed trial by jury is that once the jury has retired to consider of
its verdict it should not be subjected to so much as the appearance of any influence from any source for the purpose of producing a verdict.
Is a jury whose dissenting members have been subjected to a direct charge from the
judge an impartial jury? Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) stated that an impartial jury requires a juror to be neutral as to the outcome of the trial. Where a
dissenting juror has been told by the judge, in effect, to agree with the majority
and reach a verdict, is he now neutral as to the outcome of the trial?
34
Due process requires that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal
trial. This is stated in Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950):
All twelve jurors must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt; if only one of
them fixedly has a reasonable doubt, a verdict of guilty cannot be returned.
These principles are not pious platitudes .... They are working rules of law
binding upon the court.
35 The necessity for this requirement of due process is explained in Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) where the court held that the verdict must be based upon the
evidence developed at the trial, for only the jury can strip a man of his liberty or
his life.
36 The question of the "Allen charge" and its denial of due process is discussed in
Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the
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The court in United States v. Thomas has dealt another blow to the
"Allen charge" in banning the use of the charge within its district and substituting a charge approved by the American Bar Association, 37 which omits
the direction to the minority jurors to reconsider their views. Yet, at
best it is but a glancing blow and not the knockout punch desired. For in
making its decision, the Thomas court chose to take only a cautious step forward3 s and merely ban the charge under its supervisory authority. The
court failed to expose the "Allen charge" as a coercive and unconstitutional
means of forcing a verdict from a deadlocked jury. Therefore, although
the Thomas court did endorse the trend away from upholding the use of the
"Allen charge" 39 it also demonstrated the court's own reluctance to completely loose the shackels of this outdated doctrine.
VA. L. Rv. 123 (1967). The seriousness of this problem is given a
practical illustration in Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 1966)
(Coleman, J., specially concurring):
It . . . seems from practical experience that after a jury has retired to consider
its verdict, has done so for some time and has indicated that it is in hopeless
deadlock, every juror, not being trained in the law understands from the Allen
charge that what the judge wants is a verdict. So, there the previously reluctant
juror stands, fancying himself in opposition to the wishes of a United States
Judge, which is about the last position in which he ever wanted to find himself.
He is only exercising everyday human nature when he gets out of that unhappy
predicament just as quickly as he can.

Allen Charge, 53

37

AMi. BAR ASS'N PhoJEcr ON MINImUM STANDARDS FOR CRiM. JusncE,

TRIAL BY

JuRy, § 5.4 at 145-46 (Tentative Draft, 1968).
The instruction recommended by the A.B.A. is as follows:
Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which
informs the jury:
(1) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
(2) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with
a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual
judgment;
(3) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial
consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
(4) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine
his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(5) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect
of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict.
The obvious difference between this charge and the "Allen charge" is that the dynamite-the specific charge to the minority jurors to reconsider their opinions in light
of the majority and question the correctness of that opinion-has been eliminated.
38 The Thomas court did not hold that the Allen charge was coercive, and failed
to discuss the constitutional question. Rather it predicated its decision on the needs
of judicial administration. Yet, it is submitted that in banning the Allen charge and
recommending in its place the charge approved by the A.B.A., set out in note 37 supra,
which eliminates the controversial dynamite portion of the charge, the Thomas court
is impliedly admitting that which it is hesitant to express-that the arguments against
the charge as unconstitutional and coercive per se have merit.
39 See notes 10 and 12 supra.
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The "Allen charge" is an anachronism in our modem age. 4° It has no
place in a society in which jury verdicts are regarded as the result of patient
and impartial deliberation.4 1 Its very use shows a failure by the courts to
recognize that a hung jury is at least a temporary victory for the accused
and a valid alternative to a verdict of guilty or not-guilty; 42 that the majority of the jurors are not necessarily correct;43 and that a unanimous
verdict, in criminal cases, means exactly that.44 Hopefully the trend away
from the use of the "Allen charge" will continue. More importantly, it is
urged that future decisions expose its more seriously objectionable characteristics and thereby insure that the "dynamite charge" will be defused
forever.
F.A.T.

40 See, Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting).
41 See note 26 supra.
42 See United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir. 1969); Huffman v.
United States, 297 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting).
43 See cases cited note 25 supra.
44 See Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 741 (5th Cir. 1966) (Coleman, J.,
specially concurring); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

